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PETER FONSECA'S AND FRANCIS SUAREZ'S CONCEPT OF GOD'S SUBSTANTIALITY

1. Introduction

The issue of God's substantiality is undoubtedly one of key problems on the grounds of classical philosophy, and metaphysics in the first place, since it is in the centre of philosophical interpretations of the world. There are numerous works as far as the subject is concerned. In this context, one can notice that the problem was less referred to as that of God and attempts to say if he belongs to one of Aristotle's concepts of substantiality. The issue was vividly discussed in the Renaissance – and one concept was worked out by the school of Jesuits.

The Jesuits – after long and heated discussions – chose St. Thomas Aquinas's philosophy but soon created their own school of philosophy, which beside the school of Dominicans (Thomas's philosophy) and Franciscans (Duns Scotus's philosophy) was at the turn of the XVI century the third important school of Christian aristotelism.¹

The most renowned of the schools was Francis Suarez, whose ideas gave foundations for a certain doctrine called suarezianism, and influenced the shape of the modern philosophy. *“Disputationes metaphysicae”* by Suarez (1597) in the beginning of XVII century were lectured on the field of metaphysics not only in schools of middle and western Europe owned by the Jesuits but also at German Calvinist and Lutheran universities, and they played an important role in shaping protestant scholasticism.² Bearing in mind Suarez's concepts we would also like to take into account Peter Fon-

¹ See J. Czerkawski, *Filozoficzna szkoła franciszkańska w XVII wieku*, “Roczniki Humanistyczne” XXXIV (1986), z. 2, p. 119.

² See J. Czerkawski, *Humanizm i scholastyka. Studia z dziejów kultury filozoficznej w Polsce w XVI i XII wieku*, Lublin 1992, pp. 161–162.

seca's ideas, who was a precursor of the school and whose thoughts were guidelines in it.³

Fonseca referred then to frequently raised questions: what are the possibilities of getting to know God and defining his nature? What kind of being is God? Is God a subject of metaphysics? One of the questions – which is discussed in this article – was: Is God, like other beings, a being of a certain category? In what sense is God a substance?

2. Renaissance discussions about God's substantiality

Fonseca's questions have already been dealt with in the XIV and XV centuries, especially by nominalists who followed Wilhelm Ockham and John Buridan. The nominalists in particular meant God as a definite individual being, namely substance. If God belongs to the substance category, then he can be defined. This cannot be a definition in the classical sense – that is to say: made by the closest kind and difference in category distinction but obtained through pointing to the most important qualities constituting the essence of God.⁴

Neoplatonists were of a different opinions: they claimed that God pre-existed and is a transcendent being, that is to say – he does not fall under a category and he cannot be ruled by the laws applied in the world of finite beings. Nicolaus Krebs, as a dedicated Plato follower, claimed that God, although he is an and individual and particular being, he is still much more perfect than other beings, and that is why he does not fall under any categories and cannot be brought down to any category.⁵

The Platonic stance, however, was not homogeneous. When one changes the perspective of looking at reality – that is to say, God is included into the whole reality, then the term substance becomes ambiguous and is only one of the ties linking the world of beings. Marsilio Ficino, paraphrasing Plato's concept of hypotheses, spoke of five substances embracing the whole universe. In his vision God was the substance – the most perfect and noblest being – but realities ontologically weaker were substance as well. God

³ See *ibidem*, pp. 165, 169, 177; see also K. Gryżenia, *Arystotelizm i renesans. Filozofia bytu Piotra Fonseki*, Lublin 1995, pp. 13–14.

⁴ See S. Swieżawski, *Dzieje filozofii europejskiej w XV wieku*, vol. IV: *Bóg*, Warszawa 1979, pp. 301–302; before mentioned, *Między średniowieczem a czasami nowymi*, Warszawa 2002, p. 53.

⁵ See S. Swieżawski, *Dzieje filozofii europejskiej w XV wieku*, vol. III: *Byt*, Warszawa 1978, p. 279.

was not only one substance, one category being, one designate of the term substance but substance and its hypostases were all its hypostases constituting the hierarchy of all other beings.⁶

In the discussion, Scotus's followers defined God as substance, underlined his individuality and thus were in favour of the nominalists' approach in this matter, but at the same time claimed in opposition to nominalists' that God is not a category being. On the other hand, Scotus's followers being closer to Aquinas claimed that God is transcendental in the light of categories and does not fall under any of them – he is simply beyond them. In this approach the followers of Scotus and Aquinas were unanimous. Thomas Aquinas Aristotle's division of being into ten categories limited to created beings. Those who ascribed God category way of existence were seen as radical followers of Aristotle and they did not go beyond Aristotle's categories and considered God to be in the first category singled out by Aristotle.⁷

This so much complicated problem in the XV century faced a change of the Aristotelian understanding of abstract, which was moved from the acquisition order to metaphysics, and that led to posing a thesis *universalis realia*. It seems that the change was a result of mixing the Aristotelian and Platonic tradition, which consequently resulted in thinking (Pico was of the opinion) that abstract can be self-existent independently – therefore is a absolute being; an individual being – a limited being, which participates in the absoluteness and fullness. In other words, *abstractum* is characterized by independent *esse* in which all concrete and individual being participate, for instance: a white thing participates in whiteness and a warm one in warmth. Such understanding of abstract and something definite led to an absurd notion that God as an individual being participates in something more perfect than possesses general existence.⁸

To make the above presented opinions perspicuous let us summarize what has been said. Therefore, nominalists claimed that God is a definite definable individual substantial being. Neoplatonism possessed two interpretations: one says that God is an absolute individual and transcendent being in the category existence; the other says that the category of substance belongs to God as well as to other inferior beings. According to the radical followers of Aristotle, God belongs to the category of substance. Finally, according to the tendency of metaphysical realism, general beings

⁶ See S. Swieżawski, *Dzieje filozofii europejskiej w XV wieku*, vol. IV, op. cit., p. 303.

⁷ See *ibidem*, pp. 303–304.

⁸ See S. Swieżawski, *Dzieje filozofii europejskiej w XV wieku*, vol. III, op. cit., p. 278.

exist independent of individual beings and thus God could equally exist in general.

In this context, one should add that representatives of the Church calling for doctrinal clarity were adamant to see any attempts to change the concept of existence of general beings; they were in favour of the idea that only individual beings exist in reality. The followers of Aquinas were of the same opinion and the nominalists even more. It is therefore not surprising that many thinkers were in favour of various kinds of nominalism: the concept of Ockham or Buridan's terminism.⁹ That is why the question: *utrum Deus possit poni in paedimento substantiae?* (e.g. does God belong to the category of substance?) was being promoted by the nominalists and many philosophers were under its influence because even those against nominalism supported the notion, for example P. Nigri.¹⁰

This short review shows that the problem of God's substantiality according to the school of Jesuits was very vexed.

3. The primary substance – the proper sense of the term substance

P. Fonseca, like many other thinkers of his time, claimed that God is characterized by his individuality and asked if he fell under the category of substance. His considerations began, however, by giving four meanings of substance:

- 1) Substance is meant as the essence of a thing, especially of a universal one and that can be definable.¹¹
- 2) Substance as a thing, which is not accidental but is not thoroughly a thing; e.g. differences in the substance: matter and form.¹²

⁹ See S. Swieżawski, *Między średniowieczem*, op. cit., pp. 50–51.

¹⁰ See *ibidem*, p. 53.

¹¹ "Haec autem (substantia) quatuor modis potissimum usurpatur. Uno, pro quavis essentia rei praesertim universali, et que definitione explicari potest". P. Fonseca, *Commentariorum in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae*, vol. II Coloniae 1615, 513 B. In his reflections the author uses the following edition: P. Fonseca, *Commentariorum in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae*, Coloniae, vol. I–III, 1615; vol. IV, 1629; reprint by Hildesheim 1964. In vol. I and II *Commentariorum* titled *Questiones* are arranged in two columns on each page. The columns are divided in sectors from A to F. So further the work is cited in the following way: *Commentariorum* II, 513 B, the letter II stands for volume, 513 – column, B – sector in the right column.

¹² "Pro quavis re, quae non sit accidens, etiamsi incompleta sit: qua significatione Aristoteles (...) tum differentias substantiarum, tum etiam materiam et formam substantias appellat, ut eas ab accidentibus distinguat". *Ibidem*, 513 C.

- 3) Substance as a thing, which is not accidental but is a complete thing.¹³
- 4) Substances as primary substances.¹⁴

From these four notions of substance Fonseca considered to be the most important the first and fourth ones, then substance as essence and substance as the primary substance. He saw a connexion between them both and explained that substance as the essence of things can be considered in the broader and strict sense. In the strict sense denotes the primary substance, and in the broad sense denotes universals, that is to say *ratio obiectiva*.¹⁵ Thus, the definition of substance in the strict sense denotes the primary substance and covers the fourth notion in Fonseca's understanding of substance. In the broad sense it applies to other substances since essence in a definition denotes species and categories – therefore refers to general contents. Therefore, one notion denotes other substances. To put it succinctly: substance – according to Fonseca – in the strict sense is the primary substance and derivatives but he favours the primary substance.

Having given the definition of the primary substance as well as the secondary substance, Fonseca fell back on the terms included in *the Categories* of Aristotle. The definition of the primary substance is: *Id quod nec de subiecto ullo dicitur, nec in subiecto ullo est*.¹⁶ The primary substance is therefore what states nothing about a subject and exists in no subject. This definition is interesting in the way that it comprises the ontological and logical moment; substance is not only the subject of definition but also requires nothing for its existence. It is the strict sense of substance because it excludes accidents from its existence. Fonseca was of the opinion that *the strict sense of substance should exclude accidents*.¹⁷ Needless to say that all the notions of substance more or less denote this aspect. Putting in opposition substance and accidents and showing their substantial dissimilarity is important. Fonseca, being the follower of Aristotle, says that what characterizes each substance – as opposed to accidents – is its

¹³ “Pro re, que non est accidens, completa tamen”. Ibidem.

¹⁴ “Pro primis substantiis”. Ibidem, 513 D. More on the subject of Fonseca's terms on substance I wrote in the work *Arystotelizm i renesans*, op. cit., pp. 139–145.

¹⁵ “Nomen substantiae presse quidem sive pro vera essentia in hoc capite, cum traditur quarta substantiae significatio, late autem sive pro quavis ratione obiectiva”. *Commentariorum* II, 513 B.

¹⁶ See ibidem, 513 F. See also *Kat.* 5, 2a, translated by K. Leśniak in: Aristotle, *Dziela wszystkie*, vol. I, translations, introductions and commentaries by K. Leśniak, Warszawa 1990, p. 34.

¹⁷ “Propria autem significatio substantiae, accidentia excludere debet. Nihil autem remotius est a conditione accidentium”. *Commentariorum* II, 513 D–E.

self-existence, subjectivity since substance exists in itself and it is a ground for accidents.¹⁸

4. Subsistentia – one of the basic conditions of substance

Fonseca, thinking about substance, used the following terms: nature, supposition, subsistentia. Let us concentrate on the last one that seems to be of paramount importance to Fonseca.¹⁹

Fonseca's claim that subsistentia tells us exactly what supposition, on the other hand, adds to the individual nature, and this "addition" is a kind of a positive being, which makes things belong to a category of substances and differentiates things.²⁰ "Addition" that supposition gives to the individual nature is not an accident or a being itself but restrains the nature or denotes it. The individual nature without the "addition" would be unlimited and communicative, yet unable to be a substance. To closely describe this "addition", Fonseca suggests the following terms: interior being, difference, restriction, pure term, addition, positiveness.²¹ Finally, he says that supposition which adds extra value to nature has its way of existence – by that he means existentia²² – not pure but substantial existence.²³ To put it briefly, it is substantial way of existence, therefore substance.

Substance, apart from being a subject for an accident, is also an important characteristic of a substantial being. Fonseca, dealing with the idea, supported Kajetan's concept, but it does not mean that he thoroughly accepted it. He modified it and thus wanted to give it the original sense –

¹⁸ See *ibidem*, 513 A–E. See also *Met.* V 8, 1017b, translated by K. Leśniak in: Aristotle, *Dziela wszystkie*, vol. II, translations, introductions and commentaries by K. Leśniak and others, Warszawa 1990, p. 695. *Met.* VII 3, 1028b, *op. cit.*, p. 720. More on the subject writes M. Krąpiec in: M. A. Krąpiec, T. A. Żeleźnik, *Arystotelesa koncepcja substancji*, Lublin 1966, pp. 52–53.

¹⁹ It is not our aim here to give a complete understanding of Fonseca's understanding of subsistentia but mention just one aspect of it that he considers to be the most important. I wrote about all notions of subsistentia in the book *Arystotelizm i renesans*, *op. cit.*, pp. 149–159.

²⁰ "Suppositum creatum addere naturae singulari aliquam entitatem intrinsecam pertinentem ad praedicamentum substantiae, et rei ipsa a natura diversam". *Commentariorum* II, 546 D.

²¹ See *ibidem*, 548 C.

²² See *ibidem*, 548 E–F.

²³ "Possunt igitur suppositorum complementa in creaturis modi essendi vocari ut a bonis auctoribus appellantur, verum non puri, sed entitativi, atque adeo substantiales". *Ibidem*, 550 C. This thesis has been recalled several times. See *ibidem*, 549 A–F.

that of Aquinas. What is interesting in it is that he did not read Thomas's original manuscripts but claimed to do so.²⁴

Fonseca's problem of subsistentia – meant as substantial way of existence – is an echo of Scotus' *modus intrinsecus* and nominalists' *terminism* as well as introduced by Scotus and nominalists Kajetan's *modus substantialis*. St. Swieżawski underlines that Kajetan's *modus substantialis* did not contribute to clarification of the term substance – on the contrary, it caused its misinterpretations.²⁵ The same conclusion can be drawn in relation to Fonseca. But Fonseca is not the only one who made the understanding of substance more difficult. This theory was taken over by F. Suarez, Cartesius and B. Spinoza. Their claim that substance is characterized by self-existence led to a definition of substance as a being *per se*. All different ways of the existence of substance are modifications of the substance.²⁶

As far as Suarez was concerned, subsistentia was one of the most important quality in the matter of substance. He introduced some other qualities of substance and accidents beside subsistentia. They were needed to explain the fact of complexity of matter and form – as well as substance and its accidents found in particular substances. Thus, the mode of unity (*modus unionis*) guaranteed the unity of the primary substance and its substantial form, but the mode of inherence (*modus inhaesionis*) created the possibility for substance and its accidents to become oneness. These modes are something real and positive and exist beyond the richness of an individual being. They are truly extra elements – different from the primary substance and its substantial form, different from the substance and its accidents. Their real existence, according to Suarez, is obvious. Man normally notices the reality of matter and its form – in the same way their mode of inherence and mutual cohesion are real.²⁷

Subsistentia in Suarez's metaphysics is one of many substantial modes. His main point of argumentation covers those of Fonseca. In *Disputationes metaphysicae* Suarez explained that subsistentia becomes one substantial mode that makes individual nature exist in itself and by itself (*in se et*

²⁴ See *ibidem*, 550 E – 551 A.

²⁵ See S. Swieżawski, *Dzieje filozofii europejskiej XV wieku*, vol. III, op. cit., pp. 433–434.

²⁶ See C. Giacon, *La seconda scolastica*, vol. I: *I grandi commentatori di San Tommaso*, Milano 1944, pp. 159–160.

²⁷ See C. Giacon, *La seconda scolastica*, vol. II: *Precedenze teoretiche ai problemi giuridici: Toledo, Pereira, Fonseca, Molina, Suarez*, Milano 1946, pp. 255–260; J. Pasterski, *Tomistyczna a suarezjańska definicja substancji. Studium porównawczo-krytyczne*, Lublin 1948 (manuscript), pp. 115–117.

per se). Strictly speaking, subsistentia is not existence but a substantial mode of existence or the end of individual nature.²⁸ Suarez – more than Fonseca – was of the opinion that self-existence is the prime and most important quality of each substance. Through this quality, each substance exists in itself and by itself (in *se et per se*). It is an unconditional quality that characterizes finite substances as well as infinite substances. Being a subject for accidents is relative and belonging only to finite substances. The reason for being a subject for accidents is unimportant and second-rate as a result of imperfect created substances.²⁹

Self-existence, therefore, the only property of each substance, gives Suarez a reason for making the definition of substance as such, and then defining category substance. Thus, the general definition of substance is: a being existing by itself. The designate for such a statement is first of all God and then creation. Suarez, giving such the definition, helped Cartesius and Spinoza form the concept of substance as a being *per se*; and different modes of substance are called modifications. Spinoza speaks first of all of one substance, and all other realities are modes of this substance and its modifications. As a result, this process of thinking ended in monism and pantheism.³⁰

5. God as a category being

The above presented conclusions entitle us to say that the term substance in its basic meaning is regarded as the primary substance. This conclusion is important on the field of metaphysics as well as in the field of acquisition. A substantial being is a thing which does not mean a subject and does not exist in any subject. Substance is therefore any individual being. Fonseca used to say frequently that God is an individual being, but, one must admit that he was not convinced if God belonged to a category substance. Since substance in its basic meaning means the primary substance thus an individual substance – then God is an individual being as well, and he is the primary substance without doubt. This notion was in opposition to the common belief – Fonseca himself believed it – since the primary substance was a finite being and they fall under categories. Consequences of such reasoning were the following: God was excluded as the one beyond all categories and he was an extra being. Fonseca objected to such reasoning

²⁸ See J. Pasterski, op. cit., pp. 99–100, 118–122.

²⁹ See ibidem, pp. 125–126.

³⁰ See S. Swieżawski, *Istnienie i tajemnica*, Lublin 1993, p. 74.

and claimed that so much Socrates or a piece of stone as God – or so much more Go – is the primary substance. Thus, God is undoubtedly the primary substance – more perfect than other finite substances and takes the first place in all categories.³¹

Fonseca, advocating the thesis that God and finite substances are the primary substances, was aware of the difference among them. This dissimilarity tried to prove by ways of the etymological analysis of the terms *subsistere* and *substare*, which define closer the term substance. *Subsistere* denotes a subject that exists by itself but not in another. Another term *substare* denotes a subject which creates grounds for accidents. The author noticed that the first quality belongs to God as well as to finite substance. The other quality, e.g. being a subject for accidents, is relevant in relation to finite substances. Thus, etymology of the term “substance” and the terms *subsistere* and *substare* is not the best way to prove that God belongs to a category substance since he possesses no accidents. All category substances are the only primary substances, they exist by themselves and they are the subject of their qualities. As far as God is concerned, it is impossible to apply the above mentioned terms since he is self-existent. But this does not mean, according to Fonseca, that we cannot consider God to be the primary substance.³²

To fully understand the problem, Fonseca referred to the understanding of the secondary substance. As in the case of the primary substance so much in the case of the secondary substance he used to recall Aristotle's words: *Secundae substantiae (...) sunt genera et species, in quibus insunt primae, hoc est, sunt quibus collocantur essentiali subiectione cuiusmodi substantiae sunt animal et homo.*³³ Such substances are “animal” and “man”, e.g. species and categories and they are designated in the logical order. In the

³¹ “In qua definitione (the primary substance – K. G.) ens finitum et completum solet intelligi, quia illud tantum habet locum in praedicamentis. (...) Nam, ut Sokrates his lapis, et huiusmodi, sunt primae substantiae, quia nec de subiecto ullo dicitur, nec in subiecto ullo insunt: ita et Deus. (...) Deus est (...) verissima prima substantia: non tamen ut prima substantia in praedicamentis ponitur, sed absolute”. *Commentariorum* II, 513 F – 514 B. Fonseca gives quite a number of other arguments that are in favour of the opposite argument that he does not accept. *Ibidem*, 514 C – 515 E. I have already written about this on another occasion. See *Arystotelizm i renesans*, op. cit., pp. 94–98. Those considerations require mentioning the reflection included therein.

³² “Quo nec Deus, neque ulla divina persona dicitur substantia iuxta Latini nominis veriores etymologiam quam a substantiis finitis ductam esse, perspicuum est”. *Commentariorum* II, 513 E; see also 513 A – 514 C. The similar understanding of *subsistere* and *substare* according to Thomas Aquinas gives M. Jaworski, *Metafizyka*, Kraków 1988, pp. 148–149.

³³ *Commentariorum* II, 515 F – 516 A.

same way the primary substance is dependent on the secondary substance since its essence depends on category or specimen. We have the opposite of such reasoning when our considerations are brought on the field of metaphysics. Here, the secondary substances in their existence are dependent on the primary substances. This dependence noticed Fonseca, concluding: *The secondary substances are called this since they need the primary ones to become existent.*³⁴ From the metaphysical point of view the secondary substances are in relation to the primary ones in the same way as accidents to substances. They simply need a subject in which they become existent. If we wanted to consider God as the secondary substance, he would need another subject to become existent, therefore, he would become an accident of the substance, and that is absurd. This argument entitles Fonseca to talk about God as the primary substance – and we cannot claim that he is the secondary substance both on the metaphysical and acquisition grounds. God does not need other things to exist and does not fall under categories.³⁵

The differentiation between the primary and secondary substances led on the threshold of the Modern Ages to a vivid discussion. Questions were raised: is the primary substance self-existent and the principle of the secondary substances or the secondary substances are the principle of individual substances? Therefore, whose concept is it? – Plato's or Aristotle's.

The followers of Aquinas and Ockham denied the reality and self-existence of the secondary substances, and their importance in relation the primary substances. There were exceptions, however, because some followers of Aquinas were claiming that the secondary substances were self-existent and the primary substances were characterized by a subject for accidents. Plato's influence was that at some stage there was a tendency saying that individuals, specimen and categories are also substances. This tendency was not only seen among the followers of Aquinas but also Dominic from Flanders (1425–1479) was of the opinion that general substance is the principle of concrete entities. Dominic was aware that such opinions were rejected by the school of Aquinas. He himself claimed that he was favouring the concept of the common nature as the real principle of all individual beings and that it is in accordance with Thomas's philosophy. In just one case Dominic claimed something different to what Aquinas held: namely, the primary

³⁴ "Secundae autem substantiae ideo dicuntur secundae, quia indigent primis, in quibus existent". Ibidem, 516 A–B.

³⁵ "Nihil praedicari posse de Deo, quod sit secunda substantia, cum Deus nulli generi aut speciei subici possit. Hue accedit, quod in Deo nulla omnino entitas reperitur, quae indigeat re aliqua, in qua existat". Ibidem, 516 A.

substances are more than substances in relation to the secondary substances when they function subjects for accidents.³⁶

Fonseca got to know some theories of those who were following Plato in his considerations and thought that substances are rather general things than individual beings – and that generals are the principles of individuals.³⁷ Fonseca, while dealing with the problem, seems to support more the philosophy of Aristotle than Plato. Many of his statements prove that: only the primary substance, he says, is substance in the strict sense;³⁸ categories and species are not substances;³⁹ only an individual and concrete being is the principle of existence and getting to know all other beings;⁴⁰ the secondary substance is not a being in action but in ability since it is not self-existent – this existence is due to certain objects, thus the primary substances that are characterized by being in action;⁴¹ whatever constitutes species is less perfect and actual than any individual.⁴² In the light of the pretty clear Aristotelism, the following statement about Plato comes as a surprise: Plato can be wrong in saying that the common things exist *per se*, and that they are more substances than individual things.⁴³ In the same spirit, accepting Plato's argumentation, Fonseca wrote about subsistentia that is inherent not only in the primary and complete substances but also in the secondary substances. Fonseca believed that Thomas Aquinas was of the same opinion, who claimed that the quality of self-existence belongs to the se-

³⁶ See M. Markowski, *Definicje substancji w "Komentarzu" do Metafizyki Dominika z Flandrii*, "Studia Mediewistyczne", VI (1964), p. 48.

³⁷ "Sed hoc intererat quod recentiores qui Platonem sequebantur, universalia magis substantias esse existimarent, quam singularia; proinde, ea potius esse principia quam singularia iudicarent". *Commentariorum* IV, 76b F – 80a A.

³⁸ According to Fonseca substance in its proper sense is the primary substance. See *Commentariorum* II, 513 D.

³⁹ Fonseca supporting Aristotle in his reasoning says: "in disputatione contra ideas Platonis, negat genera et species substantiarum esse substantias", *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰ "Substantia (prima) est primum, ac praecipuum ens, et ex cuius cognitione ceterorum omnium tuum esse, tum perfecta cognitio pendet". *Commentariorum* III, 196 explanatio.

⁴¹ "Substantiae universales (...) quaemadmodum et partes integrantes, non sint actu substantiae, ut Plato existimavit, sed potentia: non quo ita sint potentia, ut aliquando possint esse actu, veluti partes integrantes, (...) sed quia habend esse in singulari substantia, cui primo convenit operatio, et distinctio, ac proinde veluti materiales partes accipiunt complementum additione differentiarum, quibus contrahuntur ad singulare substantias". *Ibidem*, 411.

⁴² "Quidquid enim ut species concipitur, imperfectius minusque actuale cogitatur, quam quodlibet eius individuum". *Commentariorum* II, 520 E.

⁴³ "Nisi quod hoc peccavit Plato, quod universalia per se cohaerere, magisque substantias esse putabat". *Commentariorum* IV, 80b A.

condary substances prior to the primary ones.⁴⁴ One can draw a conclusion that Fonseca was in line with Aquinas just theoretically but in fact shared the opinion of Dominic from Flandres, e.g. the secondary substances to his mind were self-existent and were prior to them in existence. When speaking of the primary substances, he considered them to be subjects for accidents.

Fonseca, claiming that God is an individual concrete entity, supported the common stance in the matter at that time. The stance was valid for the follower of Aquinas, Duns Scotus, radical Aristotelians, nominalists, especially in certain interpretations made in their considerations. Fonseca came closer to nominalists by saying that God is a substantial being. The idea of God's substantiality in each school was different – it was confusing and unclear. Fonseca's opinion is also difficult to put in one definite school of interpretation. His thinking some elements from one school and some elements from others. He did not seem to accept one definite way of argumentation. His thought that God is an individual concrete entity and belongs to the category substance brought him close to nominalists. The category substantial God was typical of the nominalists' speculations.⁴⁵

Fonseca's notion of God's substantiality is an example of the strong influence of nominalists. Fonseca was essentially against nominalism but despite that certain elements influenced his metaphysics. As a consequence, he is blamed for taking over some of the nominalists' theses – instead of fighting them in his philosophical consideration. This Latin text is to support the opinion: *Non desunt, qui dicat, nos libro 5. postquam impugnavimus eam Nominalium sententiam, (...) in impugnatam sententiam incidisse. (...) Sed luce clarius est nihil tale esse in loco, quae citant; nec aliud quicquam, unde colligi possit.*⁴⁶ To tell the truth, Fonseca placed the above mentioned text in another context rather than the one we are presently interested in but it is still relevant to say that he was nominalist in his philosophical thought.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ “Apud Philosophos autem, subsistere primo modo sumitur pro esse per se, hoc est non in subiecto inhaesionis, quo pacto omnis substantia sive completa sint, sive incompleta, subsistere et hypostasis habere dicitur, subsistentiaque et hypostasis interdum appellatur. Quo pacto non tantum primae substantiae, sed etiam secundae et substantiarum partes subsistere dicuntur, imo D. Thomas (...) saepius ait, quia subsistere hoc pacto convenit substantiae, qua ratione substantia est, id circo secundas substantias prius sibi vindicare subsistentiam quam primas”. *Commentariorum* II, 522 A–B.

⁴⁵ See S. Swieżawski, *Między średniowieczem*, op. cit., p. 53.

⁴⁶ *Commentariorum* III, 410b D–E.

⁴⁷ See D. Martins, *Essência do Saber filosófico, segundo Padre da Fonseca*, “Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia”. IX (1953), pp. 401–402.

6. In conclusion

The subject of God's substantiality under discussion in the school of Jesuits contributes to the complicated considerations in this matter in the Renaissance. Their considerations, however, did not eliminate the existing intricacy in the subject under discussion. The base for their reflections upon the above mentioned concept were written texts by P. Fonseca and F. Suarez. One can claim, as far as God's substantiality is concerned, that the two philosophers are close in their understanding of the subject – Fonseca had an influence on the shape of the philosophical thought promoted by Suarez. On the other hand, the Jesuits drew their inspirations from different philosophical schools and philosophers as well as from thinkers less known in the history of philosophy; but they would not take over one of their concepts as a whole. One can deduce from this that owing to many controversial stances on the matter under discussion, the Jesuits tried to work out a spectrum of opinions that would become a sort of *opinio communis*.

The issue of God's substantiality discussed by the Jesuits comes down to their statement that God is an individual substantial and concrete entity, yet they posed some objection to that opinion and gave some extra explanation. All in all, such conclusions are close to nominalists. Although the Jesuits verbally opposed nominalism, in fact, they remained under its influence. This proves that nominalism – although it was being discredited all the way – it still enjoyed appreciation.

translated by Marian Nycz